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“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a
good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where —”
said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat. “— so long as
Ig e tsomewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said
the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
Lewis Carroll: Alice in Wonderland, Wordsworth’s Classics, p. 55
1W h a t t o D o ?
In his paper on the “Samaritan’s Dilemma”, ﬁrst published in 19751,J a m e s
Buchanan claimed to present an “essay in prescriptive diagnosis” (p. 169).
“Many diﬀerent social problems ... ” are “separate symptoms of the same
disease ...”: “We may simply be too compassionate for our own well beeing or for
that of an orderly and productive free society.” (ibid.) or — put alternatively —
“[m]odern man has become incapable of making the choices that are required
to prevent his exploitation by predators of his own species.” (p. 173) The
treatment of this disease — once recognized as a disease — requires man to
“accept the possible necessity of acting strategically instead of pragmatically.”
(ibid.)
As is well known from the game–theoretic analysis of interactive decisions2
∗Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Department of Economics, Universitt des
Saarlandes, Germany. I am indebted to Matthias Leder and Dieter Schmidtchen for helpful
disussions and critical comments. A ﬁrst version of this paper has been presented at the
Conference “Freedom in Constitutional Contract — James Buchanan meets his german friends
and critics”, Bielefeld, April 19–21 1993.
1The article originally was published in the Volume “Altruism, Morality and Economic
Theory”, edited by E.S.Phelps. All further citations of page numbers without an author’s
name refer to the reprint of the paper in the collection “Freedom in Constitutional Contract”
(Buchanan [1977]).
2Binmore [1992] provides an excellent introduction to game theory. Dixit/Nalebuﬀ [1991]
illustrate game–theoretic reasoning in a non–technical manner and with reference to situations
from everyday life. The book on game theory by Rasmusen [1989] aims at the straightforward
application of the theoretical apparatus to ‘economic problems’.
1the main problem with strategic moves is their credibility. For the prescribed
treatment to be eﬀective credible threats or promises must be possible. But, as
Buchanan notes, for credibility to be established, the samaritan “must accept
the prospect of personal injury.” (p. 175) Even if it is correct that “[t]o the
extent that the parasite believes that the samaritan has, in fact, adopted a
strategic behavioral plan and that he will, in fact, abide by this plan once
adopted, there need be no loss to the samaritan at all”, the problem lies in the
premises.
This paper focusses on the problem of credibility, i.e. on the question
whether the samaritan can in fact claim to behave in accordance with some
announced behavioral pattern. Therefore I would like to sidestep the issue of
diagnosis: it will not be asked whether the situation presented by Buchanan
can really be qualiﬁed as a disease or, if so, requires treatment. Rather it will
be accepted as a matter of fact. The aim will be to look at the possibility of
an eﬀective cure, the preconditions for the therapy to be successful and the
long–run eﬀects if the preconditions are fulﬁlled.
The analysis will proceed as follows: In the next section the problem is
presented again in the game–theoretic formulation employed by Buchanan. It
turns out to be necessary for the applicability of strategic moves that the game
is repeated. The object of further analysis therefore has to be the repeated
(sequential) game (or supergame). Section three deals with the possibility of
strategic behavior in repeated games with or without a ﬁnite time horizon. In
this section the central problems of credibility will be tackled and the precon-
ditions for eﬀective strategic moves will be worked out. The ﬁnal section looks
for possible long run eﬀects by pointing to extensions of the analysis to issues of
evolutionary stability. This extensions are supposed to complement the remarks
Buchanan makes on the evolutionary origin of the disease, i.e. that “modern
man has ‘gone soft’ ” (p. 173).
2 The Samaritan’s Dilemma
The Samaritan’s Dilemma is the result of an interaction between two players.
Player A is a ‘potential samaritan’ (p. 174 ﬀ.), the other player (B) is a ‘potential
parasite’. A has to choose between two courses of action, labelled ‘bc’f o r‘ b e h a v e
charitably’ and ‘bn’ for ‘behave noncharitably’. Likewise B has two alternative
options, namely ‘w’ for ‘work’ and ‘rw’ for ‘refuse work’.
The pay–oﬀs for A and B are determined by the combination of the options
chosen by them. They can be represented by the matrix of ﬁgure 1 where the
numbers in the lower left corner of the cells represent the pay–oﬀs to A, the
number in the upper right corners those to B3.
3The terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ samaritan’s dilemma are due to Buchanan. The reason
for this labelling should become clear when both situations are interpreted as sequential games















Figure 1: Active samaritan’s dilemma: Pay–oﬀs for the single encounter
If A and B meet once (and only once) then the resulting play will be (bc,rw)
with pay–oﬀs of 3 to A and 4 to B. The result holds for the simultaneous game
as well as for the sequential game, where one player moves ﬁrst and the move is
observable for the other player4. Furthermore, the result is independent of the
order of moves because bc strongly dominates bn. So A, if rational, always will
choose bc regardless of B’s choice or A’s expectations about B’s choice.
The important point is that there is no room for strategic manoeuvres. Any
preplay announcement by A about his intention to choose bn — either simulta-
neously or after having observed B’s move — is not credible, because this choice
would be dominated by bc. Even if A is the ﬁrst mover in a sequential game,
he cannot gain by choosing bn, even if this has an eﬀect on B’s move. Choosing
bn pays at best 2 instead of 3, the worst possible result from choosing bc.
Choosing bn instead of bc may make sense, but only if A expects his rela-
tionship with B to continue. Then the utility loss from choosing bn once may
be compensated by the utility gain from reaching the combination (bc,w)i n
later encounters. Whether this actually will work and, if ever, under which
4From the discussion in Buchanan’s paper it is not clear whether the single encounter has
to be interpreted as a simultaneous or as a sequential game. Therefore, both interpretations
should be considered. Note, however, that the matrix of ﬁgure 1 does not adequately represent
the strategic form of the sequential game. Since a strategy in a sequential game requires every
player to specify his decision at every decision node and the player moving second has two
decision nodes in the game tree, he has 2 × 2 possible strategies, e.g. for A labelled (bn,bn),
(bn,bc), (bc,bn)a n d( bc,bc). The strategic form of the sequential game is represented by a 2×4
matrix with 4 columns/rows for the player moving second.
3conditions, will be the topic of the next section. But before turning to this
question let us look at the second version of the samaritan’s dilemma which can















Figure 2: Passive samaritan’s dilemma: Pay–oﬀs for the single encounter
If interpreted as a simultaneous game, this version has two possible Nash–
equilibria characterized by the plays (bn,w) and (bc,rw). The ﬁrst one is pre-
ferred by the samaritan, the second one by the parasite. Which one of the two
equilibria is to be selected in the simultaneous game cannot be answered by
exlusively considering rationality on the side of the players. Both equilibria are
equally likely, and even ‘prominence’ of one course of action will not help if both
players are rational and know about their rationality5.
If the game is played sequentially6 there exists a so called ‘ﬁrst–mover–
advantage’: the player moving ﬁrst can determine the resulting equilibrium by
choosing his best option in expectation of the best answer given by the other
player. Again, there is no room for strategic manoeuvres: if A moves ﬁrst, then
no problem arises — by not supporting the parasite the latter can be forced
to work. But if B moves ﬁrst, A cannot credibly threaten not to support the
starving parasite, because this reaction to B’s choice of rw would hurt A himself.
And again, to hurt oneself once can make sense only if one expects this to have
inﬂuence on the future behavior of the opponent in an ongoing relationship.
Although it is not intended to discuss questions of diagnosis here, a short
5This holds even if one equilibrium Pareto–dominates the other. To the problem of equi-
librium selection in coordination games see Gilbert [1989] or Sugden [1991].
6As for the representation in strategic form the disclaimer of the previous footnotes applies.
4remark seems to be in order: the dilemma does not result from the fact that
the equilibrium of the ﬁrst version or one of the equilibria of the second version
are Pareto–dominated by another possible outcome, as it is the case in the
prisoner’s dilemma. Rather, the active samaritan’s dilemma “that player A is
worse oﬀ than he would be in cell III [the combination of (bc,w) in ﬁgure 1,
C.K.]” (p. 170) seems to result from an exclusive concern for the well–being of
the samaritan7. Buchanan’s diagnosis of a disease refers to thism welfare loss
to the samaritan, resulting from his concern for the parasite’s well–being.
Let us accept the diagnosis and look for a possible therapy. The discussion
will concentrate on the active samaritan’s dilemma, because the problem of
credibility is much more severe in this case. Additionally, the sequence of moves
in one single encounter does not matter, so that we can analyze the situation
as a supergame with the matrix of ﬁgure 1 as the (simultaneous) stage game.
3 Any Hope for a Therapy?
Buchanan claims that the dilemma can be resolved by “acting strategically
instead of pragmatically” (p. 173). This is to say that player A should try
to inﬂuence player B’s choices by changing B’s expectations about A’s future
choices. Thus, a strategic move is not meant to force one’s opponent into a
certain course of action (by only leaving open some options to him), rather it is
aimed at changing his mind about one’s own future behavior. It is exactly this
feature of strategic moves that gives rise to problems of credibility.
As we have seen in the last section, any attempt on A’s side to threaten B
with the action bn is only “cheap talk” in the stage game. If A is rational in
the sense of expected utility maximization and B knows about A’s rationality,
he can predict A’s choice of bc with certainty.
But what happens when there are repetitions, i.e. if A and B will play the
stage game n times (n>1)? Then, perhaps, choosing bn at an early stage
may pay on the whole, if (and only if) the expectations of player B thereby are
changed in a way which makes him prefer the choice of w — even if A returns
to choosing bc afterwards. Will this condition hold for rational players and will
it depend on n?
7Suppose that a social welfare function exists which allows the ordering of all possible
outcomes. This requires perhaps the assumption of interpersonal comparability of utility and
therefore a cardinal utility conception. Then a dilemma requires the result of individual actions
to be ranked inferior (with respect to the social welfare function) to some other outcome. For
this to be the case, the parasite’s pay–oﬀ has to be weighted less than the samaritan’s to
generate a dilemma in the ﬁrst case, and it has to be weighted less than 6/7 of the samaritan’s
to generate a dilemma in the second case if one refers to the sum of the pay–oﬀs as a measure
for the social welfare. Only then will the combination of (bn,w) be better than the equilibrium
(bc,rw).
53.1 Strategic Behavior in Finite Horizon Games
Let us assume that both players are rational and that the time horizon is ﬁnite
(this means that n is a positive integer). The structure of the game (i.e. the
pay–oﬀs of the stage game and the actions available to the players at each stage)
as represented by the matrix of ﬁgure 1 as well as n are common knowledge.
The players try to maximize the (discounted)8 sum of the pay–oﬀs over the n
stages of the game.
Thus, to choose bn instead of bc at stage i will pay only if the opponent
thereby can be expected to choose w at future stages and the advantages from
these choices at later stages outweigh the actual utility loss. This means that








Let us assume that this inequality holds. This will only be a necessary, not
a suﬃcient condition for the choice of bn. In this inequality it is supposed that
by choosing bn once the samaritan can induce B to choose w for the rest of the
game, even if A turns back to bc after i.
This in turn requires B to expect A to choose bn at future stages whenever he
chooses rw at some stage j>iand that B does not gain by receiving a pay–oﬀ of
4 once (at stage j) and 2 afterwards. For A to react as speciﬁed, the inequality
must hold for period j and A must expect B to choose w for the rest of the game
in response to the choice of bn in j and so on9. The problem of credibility is one
of iterated expectations about the opponents future behavior, which depends
on the opponents expectations of one’s own future behavior which ....
But as n is assumed to be ﬁnite there is a last stage where expectations do
not matter. The choice at the last stage can be analyzed without any reference
to expectations in the same way as the choice for the stage game. A will, if
8This assumption can easily be relaxed. As we shall see, discounting is not the problem in
this case, so even if future pay–oﬀs are not to be discounted, the solution Buchanan proposes
will not work.
9Otherwise the aim of A, i.e. to arrive at a combination of (bc,w), can be reached only
if B continuously and mistakenly expects A to play bn even if this expectation cannot be
fulﬁlled whenever A’s preferred outcome is realized. Because of the dominance of bc Aw o u l d
never try to induce B’s choice of w if this confronts him with the cost of really choosing bn
at each stage. Thus, in the active samaritan’s dilemma with ﬁnite time horizon the solution
in Buchanan’s sense, i.e. where the Samaritan can credibly threaten to behave noncharitably
by actually acting in this way for a limited time and then switching back to bc,s e e m st o
require that B chooses continuously on wrong expectations. This hardly can be classiﬁed
as an equilibrium in any sense. The prescription would be more realistic for the passive
samaritan’s dilemma, where B can expect A to choose bn as punishment for deviation to rw
if therby B is forced back to w. In this case for A to choose bn at stage i, the inequality
1+
n
t=i+1 δ(t−i) · 4 >
n
t=i δ(t−i) · 3 must hold as well. But the chain of expectations is
somewhat simpliﬁed. For B to play w at all future stages, he must expect A to play bn at all
future stages. But A will play bn at stage i+1 only if the inequality holds for i+1andsoon.
6rational, choose bc because nothing is to be gained by choosing bn —e v e ni f
thereby B’s expectations are to be changed, there is no future to enjoy the
beneﬁts. Thus, B will choose rw in the last period.
If A is rational and B knows A to be rational, he can predict A’s choice at
the last stage with certainty at the last but one stage. If B is rational, and if A
knows that B is rational and if A knows that B knows that A is rational then A
can predict B’s choice at the last stage as well. But then the condition imposed
by the inequality can never hold at stage n−1, because A can predict B’s choice
of rw at n and therefore can gain nothing by choosing bn. A should choose bc
at stage n − 1.
This argument can be extended backwards to the ﬁrst period, showing that
the only subgame perfect equilibrium10 is the choice of (bc,rw)i ne a c hp e r i o d .
This troublesome result of requiring equilibria to be subgame perfect is well
known and gives rise to an “inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning
and plausible human behavior” (Selten [1978:127]). It is especially vexing in
the case of dilemmas, where the prescription of “acting strategically” obviously
fails to get rational players out of the equilibrium in which they are trapped:
“Suppose that you and I face and know that we face a sequence of prisoner’s
dilemmas of known ﬁnite length (...) There is a well known argument — the
backward induction argument — to the eﬀect that, in such a sequence, agents
who are rational and who share the belief that they are rational will defect in
every round. (...) And yet, it appears that I might do better (...) to cooperate
provided you reciprocate. This is the backward induction paradox.” (Pettit and
Sugden [1989:169]) To the extent that the samaritan’s dilemma is a dilemma,
the paradoxical eﬀect of the game–theoretically correct reasoning is the same.
But there is one condition for the appropriateness of the backward induction
argument: it is the iterated sequence of ‘A knows that B knows that A knows ...’
one can ﬁnd in the reasoning backwards from the last stage, as sketched above.
This iterated sequence becomes more and more complicated the greater is the
distance to the last stage. An ingenious escape from this iterated sequence com-
monly employed by game theorists is the assumption of ‘Common Knowledge
of Rationality’, or CKR. Additionally to the game structure and the number
n, every player knows that every player is rational and that every player knows
that every player is rational and so on ...
Given CKR, there is, at ﬁrst sight, no problem in analyzing a sequential game
with ﬁnite length (a repeated game with known end period) by starting at the
last node and reasoning backwards. When taking a second look, however, one
ﬁnds a possible inconsistency in the reasoning: it is necessary for the predictions
of the choices at later stages to make sense that the premises employed in
the derivation of these predictions are valid (cf. Bonanno [1989]). Thus, the
predicted choice of rw by B at the last stage is valid only if CKR can be
10For the notion of subgame perfection and its extension to perfection (or “trembling–hand–
perfection”, as it is called by some authors) see Selten [1975].
7maintained at the last stage.
More formally: Given CKR, one can derive for every stage t of our game a
proposition Pt which says: ‘If stage t is reached, rational play requires the choice
of actions (bc,rw)’. All propositions are known to the players and together they
deﬁne the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The important fact is that in the derivation of proposition Pt the proposition
Pt+1 has been assumed to be valid. This seems to be no problem, given CKR
— but proposition Pt+1 has to be derived even if at stage t+1 deviations from
the rational play at earlier stages have been observed, which contradicts CKR.
The derivation of the equilibrium path necessarily involves considerations about
what would be oﬀ the equilibrium path — but the latter must be void if CKR
is valid, because no one ever deviates from optimal play. Thus “[c]onventional
arguments on subgame–perfect equilibria require counterfactuals of the form:
‘if a rational player made the following sequence of irrational moves, then ...”
(Binmore [1987:198]) The players must be able to deal with deviations from
rational play while they know at the same time that their opponent is rational
and knows that they are rational themselves and so on.
The only possibility for sticking to CKR despite the fact that moves have
been observed which should not have been observable given CKR is to suppose
— at every stage — that history doesn’t matter. Only then deviations from
optimal play give no rise to doubts about one’s opponent’s rationality. Exactly
this is ensured by the ﬁction of a ‘trembling hand’ (Selten [1975]). Deviations
from the equilibrium path are due to uncorrelated random errors which are
the reason for not implementing the optimal choice. The observation of bn has
to be interpreted as a tremble: A would have played bc, if not an exogenous
random error had pushed his hand towards playing bn. And as the random
errors are uncorrelated, the probability of playing bn again does not depend on
this observation.
But then the paradoxical result comes as no surprise: Strategic moves are
impossible by deﬁnition, as long as every player has to interpret observable de-
viations as trembles and not as signals. A cannot — and he cannot by deﬁnition
— have any inﬂuence on B’s expectations by playing bn at early stages. If one
applies the backward induction argument with reference to CKR, then B has
to interpret this choice as a tremble without any informational value. Hence,
we have an impossibility of strategic moves in games where CKR is assumed
because the trembling hand–interpretation of deviations is necessary to employ
CKR consistently11.
One way to escape the trembling hand–assumption is to replace CKR with a
system of iterated beliefs in the opponent’s rationality which have to be updated
after every observed move. Then B can, for example, predict A’s choice of bn
at stage n even if he has observed deviations at earlier stages, because for the
11More detailed elaborations of this argument with reference to the problems of counter-
factual reasoning can be found in Binmore [1987,1988], Bicchieri [1988,1989], Bonanno [1989],
Pettit and Sugden [1989], Sugden [1991,1992] or Koboldt [1993].
8prediction he needs only to believe that A is rational. This belief can be held
even if A plays bn at stage t − 1, because for bc to be optimal at stage t − 1A
has to be rational and to believe that B is rational and that B believes that A
is rational. The choice of bn at stage t −1 can be explained by the fact that at
least one of these beliefs does not exist, i.e. that A does not believe that B is
rational or that A does not believe that B believes that A is rational or both.
It is important to note, however, that it is impossible to single out one and
only one explanation for bn played by A at stage t−1. It might also be that A
is not rational at all. Which explanation is employed by B is rather arbitrary.
There exists one system of changing beliefs which generates the subgame perfect
equlibrium sketched above — but nothing enables us to say that this one is
the only system of updating beliefs that is compatible with or even required
by rationality itself. B cannot discriminate rationally between the diﬀerent
explanations for the failure of A to choose bc at stage t − 1. B knows that at
least one of the preconditions for the choice of bn is not fulﬁlled, but he cannot
say which one.
The extrapolation of future behavior from observed past behavior is a prob-
lem that cannot be solved by rational considerations — at least not within ﬁnite
time, because any attempt to do so ends in inﬁnite regression. Suppose that
B observes the choice of bn at one stage. This could be due to the fact that
A is not rational. If this is the case, B should expect A playing bn again and
therefore play w. But perhaps that is exactly what A wanted him to do, so
that the choice of bn is no signal of irrationality. The problem is one of self–
reference, generating undecidable situations, i.e. paradoxa like the well–known
Epimenides–paradoxon.
The situation becomes worse without dominant strategies, as one can see
by analyzing the passive samaritan’s dilemma in the way sketched above. In
general, to squeeze all information out of the observation of past play one must
speculate on the opponent’s speculations on the eﬀects of past play on future
play. These eﬀects depend on the opponent’s speculations on one’s own specu-
lations on the opponent’s speculations and so on ad inﬁnitum.
Thus, rationality has necessarily to be incomplete if a decision has to be
reached in ﬁnite time. The incompleteness indicates an exit criterion which
allows a break from the inﬁnite chain of reasoning. This exit criterion can be
modelled as a so–called ‘guessing algorithm’ (cf. Binmore [1988]). The results
produced by this algorithm may sometimes be wrong and decisions therefore
be suboptimal. Nevertheless, the algorithm is necessary to produce a result at
all. To calculate his ﬁrst move, each player must have an a–priori probability
distribution about possible types of opponents (characterized by their guessing
algorithms). Then he can determine by a ﬁnite chain of backward reasoning
the expected pay–oﬀs for every possible move. During play the probability dis-
tribution has to be updated according to the information from observed moves
(Binmore [1988], see also Kreps and Wilson [1982], Milgrom and Roberts [1982]
and Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson [1982]).
9To be sure: this procedure can be avoided if CKR is assumed. But the
price to be paid is the necessity of a trembling hand–explanation for deviations,
which precludes any inﬂuence of past play on future play: history and experience
don’t matter. In exchange one gets a criterion for the selection of equilibria that
promises uniqueness. The process described by Binmore [1988], on the other
hand, can generate almost any sequence of moves as the equilibrium of a game.
Hence, the prescription given by Buchanan, i.e to act strategically instead
of pragmatically, may work, but not necessarily. It won’t work, however, if all
agents are rational and know about their rationality. To the extent that this
is the setting that seems to be appropriate for analysis, the social scientist can
only move from diagnosis to despair: if a situation is recognized as a dilemma no
possibility for self–medication exists. Becoming aware of the situation is useless
as long as strategic moves are precluded by the assumption that deviations of
observed behavior from the rational course of action have to be interpreted as
trembles, not as signals.
3.2 The Promising Inﬁnite Horizon
The devastating consequences the requirement of subgame perfection has for the
samaritan seem to vanish if one removes the assumption of a known end period.
Then there is no last stage at which expectations do not matter and from which
the whole analysis can unfold. Additionally, the problem of inﬂuences of history
on the expectations diminishes, because “any history of play will necessarily be
short compared with the possible length of the game. (...) The assumption
that a player will behave rationally in the future, in spite of having behaved
irrationally in the past, therefore ceases to be quite so implausible.” (Binmore
[1992:356])
An inﬁnite horizon does not necessarily require the interaction to go on
forever. It is suﬃcient that the probability of one more stage is high enough at
every stage. The easiest way to model this is to assume a constant probability p
(i.e. independent of the number of stages yet played) for the game to continue.
The probability that the game will last n periods is pn−1 and the probability
that it will last forever is zero. Nevertheless, the time horizon for any player is
inﬁnite, as the number of stages yet played has no inﬂuence on the probability
that the game will go on12. The probability of continuation can be interpreted
as a discount factor13 for future pay–oﬀs which are discounted because they
are uncertain. Too high a discount rate (or too low a probability) means that
future beneﬁts may not be high enough to compensate for a present utility loss.
Then a rational samaritan can never “convince the potential parasite of his
willingness to suﬀer utility loss in order to insure that the expected value of this
12This is to say that the probability for the game to last another n periods after having
reached the nth stage equals the probability for the game to reach stage n.
13... equivalent to a discount factor δ which can be derived from a discount rate r as
δ ≡ 1/(1 + r).
10loss is eﬀectively minimized.” (p. 176) So let us assume a discount factor (or a
continuation probability) high enough for a ‘future’ to exist.
As a strategy for a repeated game requires the player to specify an action
for the ﬁrst choice and a function which maps any possible history of the game
onto possible action(s) for every stage of the game (cf. Binmore [1992:349 ﬀ.],
the set of possible strategies for inﬁnite horizon games is inﬁnite. Attention will
be restricted to pure strategies which could be represented by ﬁnite automata14.
A ﬁnite automaton can be described as a computing device which accepts
an input and produces an output. We will consider so called Moore-machines15.
These machines can be described by a ﬁnite set of internal states S, a ﬁnite
set of possible inputs I, a ﬁnite set of possible outputs O and two functions, a
transition function fT : I × S → S and an output function fO : S → O.
For our purpose the set of inputs contains the actions of one’s opponent at
one stage, the set of outputs contains the actions of oneself at one stage, and
the set of internal states builds up the memory for a ﬁnite piece of history. The
machine accepts the action of the opponent at stage n−1 as input and produces
an action for the player at stage t as output.
It is convenient to represent diﬀerent ﬁnite automata graphically with cir-
cles describing the internal states where letters within circles label the outputs
corresponding to the state, and with labelled arrows which show the transition
from one state to another induced by the respective inputs. An unlabelled arrow
points to the initial state of the machine.
The choice of a ﬁnite automaton to play the sequence of stage games equals
the choice of a strategy for the supergame. For our samaritan’s dilemma stage
game let us consider the following machines, playing the samaritan’s (ﬁgure 3)
and the parasite’s (ﬁgure 4) part respectively.
The complexity of a machine can be measured by the number of its possible
states. The machines pictured here have a maximum complexity of two. You
may imagine or invent machines of greater complexity16, but for simplicity let
us concentrate on these eight machines.
Since the complexity of each two game–playing machines is ﬁnite the num-
ber of possible combinations of states the two machines might occupy is also
ﬁnite. This fact, together with the determination of state transitions by the two
functions fT and fO ensures that any two ﬁnite automata playing a repeated
game will settle down to a cycle of ﬁnite lenght, in which an identical sequence
of plays of the stage game is realized. One can show (cf. Binmore [1992:365])
that maximization of the sum of expected (discounted) pay–oﬀs is equivalent to
the maximization of the average pay–oﬀ per cycle, i.e. the sum of the pay–oﬀs
over all stages of the cycle divided by the length of the cycle.
14Mixed strategies make it diﬃcult to specify the history of a play because any observable
action has to be seen as an instance of a random variable.
15Cf. Niemeyer [1977:71 ﬀ.], Binmore [1992:361 ﬀ.] or Binmore and Samuelson [1992].
16Even if the requirement for each and every machine is a ﬁnite complexity, there is an
inﬁnite number of ﬁnite automata.
11Figure 3: Game–playing samaritan machines
We would have to consider 16 possible pairings of machines, ﬁnding the cycle
into which each pairing settles, calculating the average pay–oﬀ for each machine
(which is the pay–oﬀ to the player who selected the machine) and looking for
Nash–equilibria. Nash–equilibria are characterized by combinations of machines
where each is a best response to the other measured in terms of average pay–oﬀs.
These possible combinations are:
1. Punishing Samaritan vs. Punishing Parasite: Cycling through (bn,rw) ⇒ average pay–
oﬀ of 1 to samaritan, 1 to parasite.
2. Punishing Samaritan vs. Tat-for-Tit Parasite: Cycling through (bn,w) ⇒ average pay–
oﬀ of 2 to samaritan, 2 to parasite.
3. Punishing Samaritan vs. Tit-for-Tat Parasite: Cycling through (bc,w) ⇒ average pay–
oﬀ of 4 to samaritan, 3 to parasite.
4. Punishing Samaritan vs. Naive Parasite: Cycling through (bn,rw) ⇒ average pay-oﬀ
of 1 to samaritan, 1 to parasite.
12Figure 4: Game–playing parasite machines
5. Tit-for-Tat Samaritan vs. Punishing Parasite: Cycling through (bn,rw) ⇒ average
pay–oﬀ of 1 to samaritan, 1 to parasite.
6. Tit-for-Tat Samaritan vs. Tat-for-Tit Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw), (bn,rw),
(bn,w), (bc,w) ⇒ average pay–oﬀ of 2.5 to samaritan, 2.5 to parasite.
7. Tit-for-Tat Samaritan vs. Tit-for-Tat Parasite: Cycling through (bc,w) ⇒ average
pay–oﬀ of 4 to samaritan, 3 to parasite.
8. Tit-for-Tat Samaritan vs. Naive Parasite: Cycling through (bn,rw) ⇒ average pay-oﬀ
of 1 to samaritan, 1 to parasite.
9. Testing Samaritan vs. Punishing Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw), (bn,rw) ⇒ average
pay–oﬀ of 2 to samaritan, 2.5 to parasite.
10. Testing Samaritan vs. Tat-for-Tit Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw), (bn,rw), (bc,w)
⇒ a v e r a g ep a y – o ﬀo f2 . 6 7t os a m a r i t a n ,2 . 6 7t op a r a s i t e .
11. Testing Samaritan vs. Tit-for-Tat Parasite: Cycling through (bc,w) ⇒ average pay–oﬀ
of 4 to samaritan, 3 to parasite.
1312. Testing Samaritan vs. Naive Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw), (bn,rw) ⇒ average
pay-oﬀ of 2 to samaritan, 2.5 to parasite.
13. Naive Samaritan vs. Punishing Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw) ⇒ average pay–oﬀ
of 3 to samaritan, 4 to parasite.
14. Naive Samaritan vs. Tat-for-Tit Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw) ⇒ average pay–oﬀ
of 3 to samaritan, 4 to parasite.
15. Naive Samaritan vs. Tit-for-Tat Parasite: Cycling through (bc,w) ⇒ average pay–oﬀ
of 4 to samaritan, 3 to parasite.
16. Naive Samaritan vs. Naive Parasite: Cycling through (bc,rw) ⇒ average pay-oﬀ of 3
to samaritan, 4 to parasite.
The results can be represented in the matrix of ﬁgure 5.
Punishing Tat-for-Tit Tit-for-Tat Naive
Parasite Parasite Parasite Parasite
Punishing 1 2 3 1
Samaritan 1 2 4 1
Tit-for-Tat 1 2.5 3 1
Samaritan 1 2.5 4 1
Testing 2.5 2.67 3 2.5
Samaritan 2 2.67 4 2
Naive 4 4 3 4
Samaritan 3 3 4 3
Figure 5: Possible combinations of game playing machines
As one easily can see, there are six Nash–equilibria in pure strategies: the
Tit-for-Tat Parasite is the best response to all but the Naive Samaritan while all
types of samaritans are equally good best responses to the Tit-for-Tat Parasite.
The other three equilibria are characterized by the Naive Samaritan as best
response to any type of parasite, and all parasites but the Tit-for-Tat Parasite
are equally good best responses to the Naive Samaritan.
14The number of Nash–equilibria may be surprising — and if the restriction on
four types of machines for each player is relaxed, one may expect the number of
Nash–equilibria to increase. In fact, the number of Nash–equilibria approaches
inﬁnity, as the complexity of the machines increases.
But all Nash–equilibria17 of the inﬁnitely repeated game have one property:
the average pay–oﬀs for the cycles generated by equilibrium–strategies are dense
in the cooperative pay–oﬀ region of the stage game limited by the minimax
pay–oﬀs. This intuitively plausible result is known as the ‘folk–theorem’18.
An illustration is given in ﬁgure 6: all Nash–equilibria of the inﬁnitely repeated
stage game generate average pay–oﬀs for the ﬁnite cycles which lay in the shaded
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Figure 6: Nash–equilibrium outcomes for the active samaritan’s dilemma
Up to now we have sidestepped the issue of credibility. Once a player has
selected an automaton which plays the game on the player’s behalf, no problem
of credibility arises. The machines are programmed to generate a response to
any stimulus — they are not rational in the sense of deciding the optimal, i.e.
expected–utility maximizing, course of action at every stage. As long as a player
can commit himself to the use of a strategy which can be represented by a ﬁnite
automaton, all credibility problems are assumed away. But any such strategy
17This means: All possible Nash–equilibria without any restriction on the complexity of the
automata involved.
18For a simple proof see Binmore [1992:369 ﬀ.].
15does not resemble rational behavior in the sense of opportunistic utility maxi-
mization. Rather it represents a form of boundedly rational behavior19,w h i c h
may be of advantage to the boundedly rational player: “[B]ounded rationality,
in essence, empowers a meta–player to make commitments to stay within a cer-
tain strategy” (Binmore [1988:15]). Or, as Buchanan puts it, there are “genuine
advantages to be gained by the samaritan from locking himself into a strategic
behavior pattern” (p. 176).
The credibility problem, however, lures at the backdoor: if one cannot really
delegate decision–making at every stage to an agent (here the machine) one must
suspend one’s own decision making capacity if one wants to follow the rule which
is represented by the automaton’s program. This is seemingly paradoxical. How
can a rational agent decide not to decide rationally? The fact that rule–governed
behavior may be advantageous to a possible rule–follower20 is not a suﬃcient
condition for the adoption of rule–following (cf Sugden [1991]). Buchanan is
right in his claim that “having once adopted a rule, the samaritan should not be
responsive to the particulars of situations that might arise.” (p. 177) Players
must be able, however, to resist the temptation of violating the rule if it seems
better to do so.
If B expects his opponent not to be a game–playing machine but rather
a rational player, the advantages from the inﬁnite repetition seem to vanish.
To be sure: if B expects the threat of eternal punishment by the choice of
bn as represented by the Punishing samaritan he never will deviate from his
choice of w. But is this threat credible if the opponent is not a programmed
automaton which really has no other option than to punish in response to rw?
The answer clearly is: no. If B deviates, the best A can expect to get if he
implements his punishment schedule is a pay–oﬀ of 2 which is worse than the
pay–oﬀ of 3 if he accomodates and play settles down at (bc,rw). There is no
incentive to implement the threatened punishment when it would be the time
to punish. Credibility could be restored if failure to punish would be punished.
But this punishment in turn is only credible if the failure to punish the failure
of punishment will be punished and so on.
The old question of ‘who guards the guardians’ is at the heart of the prob-
lem. And the answer seems to be an inﬁnite chain of punishment for failure to
punish failure to punish .... for failure to punish deviations from the cooperative
sequence (cf. Binmore [1992:377 ﬀ.]). Only an inﬁnite time horizon allows for
this answer to be implemented. The guardians may indeed guard themselves,
as long as there is always the opportunity for additional punishment, i. e. the
possibility of an inﬁnite repetition. Therefore the fact that the folk theorem
does also hold for subgame–perfect Nash equilibria comes at no surprise — as
long as the time horizon is inﬁnite.
19Marks [1992] employs ﬁnite automata to model boundedly rational behavior. This ap-
proach, however, is not without its critics (cf. Selten [1990]).
20Heiner [1983,1990], for example, shows why and when rule–following behavior is better
for imperfect agents than ﬂexible optimizing.
16But rational players — as opposed to boundedly rational players — can-
not escape the dilemma if no inﬁnite future exists. They cannot surrender their
decision making capacity unless this option is at hand. And as soon as the prob-
ability for continuation or the discount factor becomes too low, the credibility
problem arises again and the whole series of threats unravels. This will be the
case if one relaxes the assumption of a constant probability of continuation but
instead assumes a probability decreasing with the increasing number of stages
already played. Then the prospect for rational individuals seems to be not very
promising...
Boundedly rational individuals, on the other side, can escape dilemmas. And
perhaps man is better modelled as a boundedly rational decision maker than
as a cognitive Goliath, who is beaten sometimes by those small–minded Davids
who are unable to violate their personal norms of conduct when it would be
better to do so. The power which lies in the ability to stick to rules cannot be
overlooked. Frank [1988] gives impressive examples for the ‘strategic role of the
emotions’.
But if rule–governed behavior, which is either hard–wired in the inividuals or
rooted in internalized norms of behavior, makes up an important part of inter-
actions, then evolutionary concepts may be fruitfully employed. As Buchanan
tries to trace back the dilemma to the development of modern societies, at the
end a few remarks on this topic should be appropriate.
4W h i c h W a y N o w ?
“A species that increasingly behaves, individually and collectively, so that it
encourages more and more of its own members to live parasitically and/or de-
liberately to exploit its producers faces eventual self–destruction”. (p. 185) Is
this the future of an evolutionary process that led man out of the necessity to
act strategically and thus trapped him by the temptation of short–term utility
maximization?
Perhaps this view is overly pessimistic. If the samaritans are the prey and
the parasites are the predators, one might expect a stable situation where every
deviation is self–correcting: too many predators reduce the prey they live on,
and subsequently their proportion decreases (and vice versa). The issue at hand
is surely one of evolutionary stability. The problem can be analyzed by assuming
a population consisting of ﬁnite automata — not necessarily of the simple type
sketched above. Individuals here are seen as a “host for ‘memes’. Dawkins
uses the term meme to include rules-of-thumb, social norms, conventions or
other more complex idea systems that a human being may use in translating a
stimulus into a response. Evolution is seen as being responsible for a selection
being made from the pool of possible memes. After evolution has operated,
non–selected memes play a role in interpreting counterfactuals much like that
played by trembles in traditional reﬁnement theory. In brief, the non–selected
17memes serve as ‘explanations’ for what would happen if selected memes were to
deviate from equilibrium play.” (Binmore and Samuelson [1992:284])
If one looks only for strategies which are, appropriately deﬁned, evolution-
arily stable, the number of possible solutions to the inﬁnitely repeated game
can be reduced. Evolutionary stability is like a reﬁnement criterion for Nash–
equilibria in settings where the selection of diﬀerent automata is driven by the
relative performance of one type as compared to all other types.
The theoretical setting that allows for this analysis is as interesting as it
is complicated; too complicated to be reproduced here21. At the heart are
the so called ‘replicator dynamics’ which model how the relative performance
inﬂuences the changes in the population.
For our purposes it may suﬃce to look at the question of which Nash–
equilibria, resulting from the interaction of rule–following agents playing the
repeated samaritan’s dilemma, will survive in the evolutionary struggle. For
this purpose one doesn’t even need to specify the dynamic aspects, one merely
has to concentrate on the question of evolutionary stability of equilibria.
As Binmore and Samuelson [1992] have shown, in some plausible setting
only utilitarian outcomes “are sustainable as evolutionary viable equilibria (...)
The idea behind our argument is of ancient vintage. An initially nonutilitarian
population is vulnerable to invasion by mutants who recognize each other by
means of what Robson calls a ‘secret handshake’. This private signal allows
the mutants to form an insider group who cooperate among themselves but
treat outsiders as outsiders treat each other. (...) Only utilitarian machines can
be immune to such invasions and so they are the only possible candidates for
evolutionary viability.” (Binmore and Samuelson [1992:280])
The utilitarian outcome can be determined by maximizing the sum of the
individual pay–oﬀs22. In our graphic representation this means that only those
Nash-equilibria are evolutionary viable which lie on the tangent to the cooper-
ative pay–oﬀ region with the slope of -1 and the greatest possible distance to
the origin. For our active samaritan’s dilemma these are all points at the north-
eastern frontier of the cooperative pay–oﬀ region in the diagramm of ﬁgure 6.
This means that either of the Nash–equilibria resulting in pay–oﬀs of (3,4) or
(4,3) as well as any combination therefrom is evolutionary viable. There is at
least a chance for the situation where the samaritans behave charitably and the
parasites work to be an equilibrium which survives the evolutionary struggle.
For the passive samaritan’s dilemma the situation looks worse. An analysis
of ﬁgure 7 shows that the utilitarian outcome is given by (3,4). Thus, only
equilibria in which the samaritan always behaves charitably and the parasite
always refuses to work are evolutionary viable.
But these last results should not been taken too seriously: one reason is that
21The interested reader should refer to Binmore [1992, chapter 9] for an easily understand-
able introduction into the concepts of evolutionary game theory.
22This requires the pay–oﬀs to be interpersonally comparable. But as in evolutionary set-
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Figure 7: Nash–equilibrium outcomes for the passive samaritan’s dilemma
even in an evolutionary viable equilibrium the samaritans will survive and will
not be wiped out by the parasites. The second, more important reason is that
the results are extremley sensitive with regard to the assumptions about the
pay–oﬀs23. If only the additional beneﬁt to the parasite from being supported
is less than the additional cost to the samaritan, the result will be the reverse.
And as long as the pay–oﬀs are as stated, at least for a utilitarian, there
seems to be nothing wrong with the results: if the parasite’s gain outweighs the
samaritan’s loss, then the parasites should go on with the exploitation. But the
coexistence of samaritans and parasites could then be regarded as a symbiotic
relationship rather than as a dilemma.
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